The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the illusion of peace

Daily: The Pashtun Times
Date: 29.05.18

(by Amarjit Singh Dulat, Asad Durrani and Aditya Sinha; published by HarperCollins in
2018, India)

Composed of 33 chapters, the book revolves around the idea that if Indians and Pakistanis
can become friends on a neutral land, they can also become friends while inhabiting their
respective lands.


Aditya Sinha says that on the one hand TV talk shows are a platform to express one’s
hyper-nationalism portraying as if the space of conciliation were lost between the two
countries. However, on the other hand, people-to-people contact narrates a different story
– a story of cooperation and friendship. TV talk shows or other platforms spewing hyper-
nationalism cannot be permitted to close the space of amity shared by the people of two
countries at the individual level. The book is an attempt to keep the space of amity open
and opportunities for reconciliation possible in the future.


Amarjit Singh Dulat wishes what if we were friends. Dulat reveals that it was the Track-II
dialogue on Kashmir that took place in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack (26/11/2008)
bringing him and Asad Durrani closer to each other. It was the Chao Phraya Dialogue in
Bangkok, Thailand, where they co-chaired a session on terrorism. This precisely was the
purpose of the dialogue which was informal to discuss the possibilities of peace between
the two countries, to rule out any possibility for seeking revenge for 1947 or 1971 by
Pakistanis. Dulat thinks that the turn around in the recent Pak-India relations came when, in
2014, at the occasion of the oath taking ceremony of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was invited on the request of two notables from
Srinagar. Perhaps, Nawaz Sharif was not permitted by the powers that be to visit India but
he did it (without seeking permission). The military may not like Nawaz Sharif or any of his
family members accede to the throne again; instead, the incumbent Prime Minister Shahid
Khaqan Abbasi would be the preferred choice for the military.

The situation in Kashmir is volatile ever than before because of two reasons. The first is
indigenous. One component of which is that the muscular policy of the Indian government is
backfiring to alienate Kashmiris especially in the Valley from India. Another component of
which is that compared to the past the Kashmiri youth in the Valley is getting radicalized
(religiously) thereby offering more latitude to organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba to
exploit them. The atrocities inflicted upon the Kashmiri youth are forcing them to seek
refuge in religion. The consequent indoctrination-based growing radicalization is keeping
these militants active independent of the support of Pakistan. The second reason is
external. That is, Pakistan may not be offering any active (or direct) support to these newly
radicalized Kashmiri Islamic militants of the Valley, but Pakistan may be keeping the Line of
Control and the Working Boundary on the boil to offer its tacit support to their cause. This
is why the state government running the Indian part of Kashmir thinks that it is important not
to overlook the importance of Pakistan and that it is important to talk to it, as Chief Minister
Mehbooba Mufti vocalized in the state assembly in February 2018.

Asad Durrani says that during his visits abroad for training or recreation, he happened to
meet Indians. Abroad was a neutral ground for him and so were the feelings of neutrality
sans animosity. The physical and mental state of neutrality permitted him to understand
Indians and their perspective and allowed him to get closer to them beyond the prism
provided by his institution, the army.

Over the years, both Dulat and Durrani concluded that a healthy relationship between their
countries is more advantageous than it is detrimental.

Chapter 1: Setting the scene

The path led to writing the book started on 25 May 2016 at a hotel in Istanbul, where both
Dulat and Durrani stayed or met. What prompted Durrani to give consent to co-author a
book with Dulat was the latter’s book “Kashmir: the Vajpayee years” published in 2015
mentioning one side of the picture. Durrani thought that he could provide the other side of
the story. Hence, the idea of co-authoring a book started gelling. Nevertheless, Dulat’s
book revealed to Durrani that one of the major differences between RAW’s approach to the
Kashmir issue and that of ISI’s is that the RAW deployed its officers for a longer duration of
time (even for more than a decade) compared to the short span postings of ISI’s officers,
and this practice made RAW’s officers better expert on Kashmir than ISI’s officers.

The invitation to co-author a book came from Dulat in the wake of the co-authoring projects
done by them in the past, such as intelligence cooperation after the Pugwash Conference
in Berlin in 2011, and a paper published by the University of Ottawa on Kashmir in 2013.
Both Dulat and Durrani tacitly admitted that they used proxies against each other.

Chapter 2: The accidental spymaster

Durrani narrates his induction into the ISI when he was full colonel and posted as defence
attaché (1980-1984) at the Pakistan Embassy in West Germany. After General Zia’s death
in 1988, Durrani was inducted in the Military Intelligence (MI), where he spent two years
before he rejoined the ISI for another 18 months.

Durrani says that ISI’s job was the evaluation of any developing/gathering threat and
informing the relevant quarters about the same. Durrani claims to have developed the
Corps of Intelligence employing specialists (instead of generalists), on certain aspects of
intelligence, to evaluate any given threat.

Durrani’s preference remained to catch those who were on the payroll of an enemy country
(acting as a fifth column) but he kept on stumbling on an activity personal to a person
(nothing to do with national interest), such as an illicit relation of an officer with a girl, to
exact information of any kind from him by sheer blackmailing.

Chapter 3: Brotherhood to the rescue

On two counts, the RAW obliged the ISI. First, in 2003, when a tip-off from the RAW to the
ISI saved the life of General Pervez Musharraf. This favourable act contributed to the
ceasefire agreement (not to violate the sanctity of the Line of Control and the Working
Boundary) on Kashmir. Secondly, in May 2015, when Durrani’s son, Osman, originally
settled in Germany for 20 years, but with a Pakistani passport working for a Germany’s
software developing company for 15 years, went India for business. Osman was having a
visa for Kochi only but he travelled to Mumbai to get a flight to leave India. He was ignorant
of the visa procedure for Pakistanis. He was held in Mumbai and released only after Dulat

Chapter 4: Pakistan’s deep state

Durrani thinks that the concept of the Deep State, an establishment comprising a troika (big
money, the military-industrial complex and the Jewish lobby) prevalent in the US, running
the affairs of state behind the scenes is absent in Pakistan: no Deep State with a similar
constitution exists in Pakistan. Durrani claims that the Deep State in the US was found
powerful to scuttle policies of the US President Barack Obama to end the wars in
Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Deep State is also resisting US President Donald
Trump from withdrawing the US army from foreign military engagements and from improving
relations with Russia. Nevertheless, Durrani admits that on critical matters the ISI imposes
itself simply because it needs a decision or it needs to take a certain step without alerting
anyone. Interestingly, Durrani claims that the ISI is ineffective in getting civilian cooperation
unless they are willing.

Durrani also makes a tentative claim that when the ISI came to know of the presence of
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, it not only informed but also offered an opportunity to the
US to take bin Laden away from Pakistan.

Durrani claims that the international clout of the ISI swelled during the Afghan war of the
1980s. The ISI got plenty of resources which enhanced its capability to perform. However,
the post-1991 phase brought challenges to the ISI owing to the same reasons and hence
the ISI had to focus on quality instead of quantity in every sphere.

Durrani admits that domestically, police’s Special Branch was more effective in intelligence
gathering about a possible threat than the ISI, whether the example is of the Red Mosque
crisis in Islamabad or the Army Public School massacre in Peshawar. Durrani thinks that the
success of the Intelligence Bureau or the Special Branch of the police lies in the accretion
of experience and the continuity of service of its personnel which is not the case with the
ISI. Similarly, the ISI could not predict the electoral outcomes in 1970 elections, 1990
elections, and 1998 elections. Interestingly, no such claim made by Dulat if the RAW was
successful or not in predicting the outcome of any elections.

Durrani considers that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan loved to be seen, recognized and
appreciated. Self-projection was his biggest weakness.

Chapter 5: ISI vs RAW

Dulat flatters Durrani on two counts. First, Dulat says that the ISI is better just because it is
older than the RAW which was founded in 1968 after bifurcating the Intelligence Bureau (IB)
owing to the failure of the IB in 1962 and 1965 wars against China and Pakistan
respectively. This is an understatement because Dulat tries to see the qualitative
difference, if any, through the prism of age. Here, Dulat has projected the ISI to appease
the sense of superiority of Durrani. Secondly, Durrani claims successes of the ISI and one
of them is that none of its operators ever defected or got caught on camera. The same
point is acknowledged by Dulat as the failure of the RAW, but it is another feat by Dulat to
vaunt the success of the ISI in terms of the failure of the RAW.

Durrani thinks that the ISI was successful in the 1965 war in terms of how the Indian army
was assembled for war but a failure in the 1971 war in terms of not anticipating the attack in
East Pakistan. The 1965-war episode was an exaggeration by Durrani because the Lahore
front was left unattended under the presumption that India would not cross the international
border. Similarly, the 1971-war episode was a double failure for not counteracting the
activities of Mukti Bahini which did not make a sudden rush to East Pakistan but it bid its
time to set training camps inside India along the border.

Durrani thinks that in the wake of 1989 elections in Kashmir, the ISI was successful in
predicting if India was going to attack Pakistan but the ISI failed to calculate the intensity
and duration of the Kashmiri uprising, and this point made the ISI wary of the future of the
uprising and it thought to keep a handle on the uprising. Nevertheless, the ISI could not
maintain its leverage over the uprising on its own terms, though the formation of Hurriyat (to
represent multiple factions) was a success to offer a political direction and cohesion to the

Dulat thinks that it was the failure of the RAW to predict and counter Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz
Saeed and Masood Azhar. Dulat admits that the RAW did not like the ISI have a free hand
in Afghanistan just because it meant to feed the Hizb, Lashkar and Jaish in Kashmir. He
thinks that the situation in Afghanistan has repercussions on the situation in Kashmir. Free
the ISI in Afghanistan means free the ISI in Kashmir. Here, Dulat perhaps thinks that
militants trained in Afghanistan would be a potential export to Kashmir.

Dulat says that the major challenge comes not only from intelligence collection but also
from intelligence analysis. He thinks that both the ISI and RAW face problem in collection
and not in analysis. This is despite the fact that modern equipment has eased collection but
a human brain is required for analysis. This is the point both Dulat and Durrani tell a lie.

Dulat was an IB guy spending 30 years as its chief before heading the RAW. Dulat explains
this shift in his career as painful. However, in fact, he brought along substantial experience
in intelligence gathering to the RAW which is Research and Analysis Wing meant for
analysis of intelligence. This point opens two points. First, in India, a non-military man can
also be the head of the RAW, unlike in Pakistan. Secondly, the RAW chiefs are more
experienced for the task at hand than the ISI men are. This point must be seen against the
background that Durrani admits the success of Police’s Special Branch vis-à-vis ISI's in
alerting the state regarding domestic challenges.

Durrani admits that both General Zia-ul Haq and General Hamid Gul had nurtured
ambitions beyond Afghanistan. Durrani claims that both organisations have entered the
age of the media wars to wage a psychological war through financing, micro-managing, and
choreographing TV news channels. The example is borrowed from CIA’s bids to manage
certain American TV channels.

Chapter 6: The CIA and other agencies

Durrani does not rate CIA highly. He thinks that the CIA relies too much on technology
which is deceptive as happened when CIA failed to pick Indian preparation for a nuclear
test in 1998. Nevertheless, it is interesting to listen to Durrani saying this point and citing
only one example to declare an organization’s failure despite the fact that Durrani himself
lays emphasis on the qualitative strength of the ISI, which is incomprehensible without

Both Dulat and Durrani consider the British intelligence (MI6 and MI5) cool and silent actors
who have developed a culture of doing work without much fanfare.  

Chapter 7: the Intelligence dialogues

Durrani flaunts that there was no bar on him to discuss intelligence and intelligence work
with the chiefs or ex-chiefs of any other spy agency of the world. However, contrary to his
claim, Durrani is being asked by the GHQ to explain his position on the revelations he made
through the book.

Chapter 8: Status quo

Durrani says that in the past, India was in favour of the status quo on Kashmir whereas
Pakistan was keen to disrupt it. However, now reverse is the situation. Dulat agrees on this
point substantiating that the BJP-PDP coalition has dispirited Kashmiris in many ways. This
time the militancy in Kashmir is indigenous in the Valley. A few boys are in the forefront
backed by the whole population. In the past, the All Party Hurriyat Conference was
prohibited from meeting Pakistani officials in Delhi and from letting Hurriyat’s leaders to visit
Pakistan. However, now the situation has changed. Mehbooba Mufti is asking for opening
talks with Pakistan.

Durrani thinks that the composite dialogue which was concluded in 1998 to discuss the less
thorny issues such as trade first, and the bitter issues such as security, Kashmir, and
terrorism) later was a plausible formula to resolve differences in an environment of
confidence. Durrani says that there is a problem that in India some people think that
Kashmir is a bitter issue but not a core issue. Nevertheless, the Kargil war interrupted the
chances of the dialogue, about which Dulat says that Musharraf regretted as his mistake.
The dialogue was resumed in 2006 with the promise of allowing Kashmiri leaders from both
sides of the Line of Control (LoC) to interact.

Durrani says that through the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan achieved strategic stability in
the region. The four-point formula offered by General Musharraf was accepted by
Kashmiris but rejected by India just because India wanted to develop a strategic stalemate
(and not a strategic solution). India might have feared that making the LoC irrelevant for
trade could be the first step towards a European Union-type arrangement. Moreover,
Durrani thinks that by inducting the ballistic missile defence system, India has disturbed the
strategic stability forcing Pakistan to balance it with tactical nuclear weapons.

Chapter 9: The Core-K word

Whereas India considers Kashmir a bitter issue, Pakistan considers Kashmir a core issue.
The dispute is in the positioning of the Kashmir issue between the two countries.

Chapter 10: Amanullah Gilgiti’ s Dreams of Independence

Durrani tells that when Amanullah, who was originally from Gilgit, settled in Kupwara, raised
the slogan of the Independence of Kashmir, as the third option, no one took him seriously.
Rather, Pakistan (and especially Pakistani establishment) went against him. Local politics
also played a role such as Sardar Qayyum wanted Kashmir to accede to Pakistan, and so
was the slogan of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Amanullah Khan was doubted because he had a
background in the National Conference. In the Valley, he used to be the general secretary
of the Plebiscite Front. He founded the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). He got
settled abroad and during General Zia’s time when he came to Pakistan, no one took him
seriously. Retrospectively, it was a mistake to ignore him or penalize him on this account.
Durrani says that we doubted the intentions of Kashmiris that after independence they
might not gravitate towards us. Our paranoid behavior. Independence could counter the
Special Status given to Kashmir by India under Article 370. The option of an independent
Kashmir is still a viable option. However, Dulat says that India will not concede to the
independence option.

Chapter 11: Kashmir: The Modi Years

Sinha points out that Durrani keeps on referring to ongoing turmoil in Kashmir as the fallout
of Burhan Wani’s death in 2016. Dulat says that the turmoil erupted after December 2014
elections when BJP and PDP could not fetch seats they had hoped for. A consequent PDP-
BJP alliance was forged but it could not deliver on the ground. Mehbooba Mufti was made
the Chief Minister, but she remained incompetent to solve issues. By June 2016, everything
was going fine, but then the Burhan Wani incident took place. India appointed a special
representative, Dineshwar Sharma, the former IB chief, to talk to Kashmiris.  

Chapter 12: The Unloved Dr Farooq Abdullah

Dulat says in 2002, when Farooq Abdullah lost the assembly elections, he decided to visit
Pakistan. Farooq thought he was not liked by India but he was not liked by Pakistan either.
Pakistan considers him unreliable. He behaves like his father Sheikh Abdullah behaved:
revolting against Delhi, spending 23 years in jail, entering into a peace accord with Mrs
Indra Gandhi in 1975, again revolt against Delhi, and getting his assembly dismissed in

Chapter 13: Take What You Can Get

Durrani says when the context is Kashmir, do not dream for absolute gains. Take what you
can get. Durrani also says that both countries should make Kashmir the focus of
cooperation. However, for that three things have to be overlooked: events at the time of
partition, Article 370, and the LoC. The beginning must be done from trade and bus service
to enhance people-to-people contact. It is an indirect approach to solve the Kashmir issue.

Chapter 14: India and Pakistan: ‘Almost’ friends

Dulat thinks that the basic problem lies in mutual distrust, which has grown for several
reasons embedded in history. After 1975 when Sheikh Abdullah entered into an agreement
with Mrs Gandhi, the things started calming down.

All Prime Ministers of India wanted to improve relations with Pakistan but Vajpayee went
ahead of them. Vajpayee took the bus to Lahore (in February 1999), but he did not lose
heart and, even after the Kargil war, invited General Musharraf to Agra (in July 2001).
Despite disappointment at Agra, he visited Pakistan again for the 2004 SAARC (12th)
Summit. Vajpayee wanted to get the benefit of Musharraf’s presence at the helm of affairs.

Durrani says that Vajpayee’s initiative continued to benefit India because one and all
blamed us for Kargil, which was anyway a foolish operation. Durrani says that history is full
of ‘almost’ such as we ‘almost’ achieved a breakthrough when Sheikh Abdullah was in
Pakistan in 1964, but Nehru died, and the deal on Kashmir was 'almost' clinched if
Musharraf had not fallen into domestic trouble in 2007.

Chapter 15: Lonely Pervez Musharraf

Durrani says that General Musharraf was infatuated with the Kargil operation. The LoC
giving Kargil heights to India was drawn after the 1971 war, as India had captured some
heights in the Kargil sector. During the tenure of Benazir Bhutto, Musharraf could not
launch the operation but after the 1998 nuclear tests Musharraf decided to go ahead on
the premise that nuclear immunity would constrain India from crossing the international
border. Pakistan was accused of risking nuclear confrontation which could have
devastating effects. The road to Leh was blocked which was critical for India as a supply
line to Siachen. Nawaz Sharif did not know the detail of the plan and its exact

Sinha says that much to the relief of India, the telephonic discussion between General
Musharraf (speaking from Beijing) and General Aziz (speaking from Rawalpindi) was
intercepted by the RAW revealing many inside of the matter. Durrani says that the political
responsibility lay on the shoulder of Nawaz Sharif who then thought of getting rid of
Musharraf but the ugly way he used to do that on 12th October 1999 ricocheted on him and
he lost his government.

Durrani says that General Musharraf’s decision to send his army to South Waziristan in
2004 boomeranged on Pakistan in the form of militants, hardliners, fundamentalists and
suicide bombers.

Dulat says that L K Advani was the architect of the Agra Summit (July 2001) and he was
also its destroyer.

Chapter 16: Modi’s surprise moves

Dulat says that Modi was keen to improve relations with Pakistan, but the Pathankot and Uri
incidents discouraged him.

Durrani says that ISI’s preference to hardliners was because hardliners could take hard

Chapter 17: the Doval doctrine

Both discuss the Doval doctrine (pronounced in 2010) for Kashmir. India’s National Security
Advisor, Ajit Doval said that the use of force against Kashmiris pelting stones was legitimate
and this was depicted as India’s iron fist policy in Kashmir. However, the Indian army should
not overreact in Kashmir as the crisis would fade away spontaneously after some time. The
crisis cannot sustain beyond a point. On the one hand, the Indian army was allowed to
exterminate militants while on the other hand the Indian army was asked to attack Pakistani
posts to stop it sending militants by providing the cover of fire.

Chapter 18: the hardliners

Durrani says that Indian foreign office (the South Block) was a hardliner to Pakistan, even
more than Indian intelligence agencies and the army.

Chapter 19: BB, Mian Saheb and Abbasi

Durrani thinks that both General Yahya Khan and Mujib-ur Rehman tried to accommodate
the interests of both wings, but Zulfiqar Ali Bhuto sabotaged their efforts, as he wanted to
become the prime minister at all cost. Moreover, Modi’s visit to Raiwand after bad-mouthing
Pakistan both in Dhaka and Kabul was not liked by anyone. Despite that, Nawaz Sharif
welcomed him.

Chapter 20: Good Vibrations, India-Pakistan

Durrani says that the positive in bilateral relationships were that, first, the Indus Water
Treaty took place; secondly, during 1965 and 1971 wars, neither side bombed civilians;
and thirdly, after nuclear tests, the first thing established was a hotline between two
countries to avoid misunderstanding of any future event.

Chapter 21: Hafiz Saeed and 26/11

Durrani says that he was perturbed over the Mumbai attack (2008) and one of reasons for
this was that David Headley had named an ISI major involved in the attack. For the past 15
years, any report American has prepared on Afghanistan concludes in Pakistan’s
complicity. Dulat says that the strength of Hafiz Saeed lies in abusing India publicly,
whereas Durrani says that the cost of prosecuting Hafiz Saeed is too great to bear.

Chapter 22: Kulbhushan Jadhav

Durrani says that espionage is one of the oldest professions deserving respect. The
common pattern is not to sentence spies to death but to do a swap deal with the sender
country. The catch offered Pakistan a counter-narrative when India was trying to implicate
Pakistan’s involvement in the Pathankot incident. Pakistan now says that we know you have
been doing this in Balochistan.

Dulat says that Pakistan did not waste time to equal score by putting Jadhav straight to TV
to let the people know of India’s act, as India aired the intercepted Musharraf-Aziz
telephone talk during the Kargil war.

Durrani says that Pakistan is in a hurry to appease any dissident in Balochistan even by
paying money or by force so that CPEC could run. Durrani says that there are four Indian
consulates and an Indian embassy in Afghanistan but the number is highly exaggerated in
Pakistan and these offices are not the source of espionage contrary to the belief in
Pakistan, where silly and ill-informed people keep bandying about such news. Moreover,
Jadhav like phenomenon is the expression of the Doval doctrine: bleeds Pakistan through
the Taliban and Baloch separatists.

Chapter 23: Talks and Terror

Dulat says that Pakistan has a handle on militancy in Kashmir, but Durrani says that this is
not the case in absolute terms, though Pakistan tried to have influence so that events
proceed on its way, especially without any factional infighting.

Dulat says that insurgency in Kashmir was a new thing and it was spurred when, in
December 1989, some Kashmirs became able to kidnap Mufti Saheb’s daughter. This act
bolstered the confidence of Kashmiri youth that they could pressurize India to succumb to
their demands. To extend this point, they started thinking that through such daring acts
they could also seek independence from India. Pakistan also got surprised at this quick turn
of events and constructed Hizbul Mujahideen to get involved.

Dulat says that India was worried on the extension of terrorism to the South of Pir Panjal
engulfing Jammu. The two beginners were the JKLF and the Hizbul Mujahideen whereas
other militant organizations erupted afterwards. Certain incidents such as the siege of
Haratbal fanned militancy. Since 2015, groups of local boys projecting themselves as
freedom fighters have been found active in terrorism. Sinha says that the Gujrat riots of
2002 also affected the insurgency. Dulat says that the Babri Masjid demolition also
contributed to the rise of Indian Mujahideen and sought help from Pakistan, as appeared in
the case of Mumbai attacks. Dulat says that the Al Faran group which kidnapped five
foreigners never appeared again. Durrani says that the Al Faran group might be an Indian
intelligence group which did such an act to discredit Kashmiri fighters.

Durrani says that the emergence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan can be attributed to
General Musharraf who annoyed tribal people by sending hundreds to them to
Guantanamo Bay without any due process of law in 2001-2002 and then by sending army
to South Waziristan in 2004.

Chapter 24: Surgical strike

Durrani says that the pretext of Uri attack was used to launch a surgical strike in Pakistani
part of Kashmir in September 2016, if it was a strike, on Pakistan and the claim of the strike
served the Indian purpose domestically. It was a new version of strike as it was also not a
hot pursuit – to hit a place from where hostility originates. Pakistan thinks that a surgical
strike as the beginning of the Cold Strike doctrine cannot take place under the nuclear
overhang, but Pakistan should consider that it can happen as the Kargil war happened.
Durrani says that owing to the Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear

Dulat says that his fear is that another Mumbai like incident or a parliament attack should
not take place. In such a case, India would find restraint difficult.

Chapter 25: the politics of war

Sinha says that in reaction to attack on Indian parliament in 2001, through Operation
Parakram in 2002, by moving troops to the border to actualize coercive diplomacy, the
status quo was threatened. Durrani says that, at that time, the presence of the US in
Afghanistan and the nuclear overhang made us know that there was no prospects of war. It
was called the conventional-unconventional strategic paradox.

Dulat says that Aman Ki Asha launched in 2011 was a fruitful effort.

Chapter 26: The Deal for Osama bin Laden

Durrani says that Pakistan might have cooperated with the US to capture Osama bin Laden
in May 2011 but the US did not reward Pakistan because the US has a history of eating its
own words. This is how neither was Pakistan incompetent nor Pakistan was complicit.
Durrani thinks that Pakistan is not admitting it openly because of political fallouts.

Durrani also claims that the Americans did not reach Osama through Dr Shakeel Afridi but
through a tip-off from a retired Pakistani officer who had worked in intelligence, ISI. The
name of the officer is known to him and he is missing from Pakistan since then.

Chapter 27: Selfish Self-interests in Afghanistan

Durrani says that the meaning of the term strategic depth is that if India attacks, we will flee
to Afghanistan and let Indians come there to get buried as happened to big armies in the
past. He says we also talk of Iran as a relief zone to shift our air force there to protect from
an Indian attack. Similarly, Pakistan offers Afghans a strategic depth to flee Afghanistan
and seek protection and livelihood in Pakistan.

Durrani says that Pakistan’s Afghan policy is not India-centric, as he keeps on revising his
knowledge and assessment every six months.

Durrani says that the emergence of President Ashraf Ghani was because of the sustained
support of Americans and that Ashraf Ghani bad-mouthed Pakistan in Amritsar at the
behest of Americans. Ashraf Ghani is a weak President because he has no footing on the
ground and that Taliban had sustained the anti-Taliban coalition for 16 years. There should
an intra-Afghan settlement on the Taliban terms. Lately, two rounds in Doha and one round
in Murree has taken place. The second round in Murree was sabotaged by the Kabul
regime and by Americans, who are annoyed with Pakistan blaming Pakistan playing a
double game, by revealing that Mullah Umar had died in 2013 and this news hurt the unity
of Taliban. Similarly, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor who became Amir of the Tablian and who was
instrumental in sending the Taliban delegates to Doha and who sent the Taliban delegates
to the first Murree round in July 2015 was eliminated by an American drone in May 2016.
This is how the US spurns all efforts of the Taliban to negotiate a settlement on the table.
Durrani thinks that the US does not want a negotiated settlement with the Taliban in

Durrani says that the main component of the US’ Afghanistan policy is to sustain bases
there. The presence of Americans bolsters the Kabul regime and Delhi. Without American
presence, neither of them can exist in Afghanistan. Another reason for India’s presence in
Afghanistan is the financial assistance it offers and the cultural clout it enjoys. Durrani
thinks that India will never send its army to Afghanistan to assist the US-NATO forces. The
problem with Afghans is that they seek refuge in Pakistan but do not listen to Pakistan.

Chapter 28: Donald Trump, Nudger-in-chief

Durrani says that Donald Trump is continuously nudging Pakistan to do more even if it were
beyond Pakistan’s capacity to meet the demand.

Dulat says that, in the 1990s, Americans were active in Kashmir meeting Kashmiri
leadership but this activity stopped after 9/11. They even changed the jargon from freedom
fighters to terrorists.

Chapter 29: Pakistan’s Pal, Putin

Durrani says that, in 2012, the Russians invited him under the ruse of a nuclear conference
to discuss post-Soviet Afghanistan. In 2015, he was pleasantly surprised to read an article
written by a London-based writer Polina Tikhonova who claimed that a new superpower axis
comprising China, Russia and Pakistan was emerging. Iran might join it in due course.

Durrani says that recently Russia has asserted itself by annexing Crimea and has gained
influence in the Levant. Even Turkey is paying Russia respect.

Chapter 30: Forge Structure or Break Ice?

Dulat says that Kashmir be given priority in confidence-building between the two countries,
besides undertaking all efforts to restore people-to-people contact, trade, sports, travel,
communication, cultural exchange, mutual talks, etc. Durrani says that the Track II, behind
the scene channel, be continued.

Chapter 31: Council of Spies

Dulat says that the talk between intelligence agencies be institutionalized, instead of relying
on occasions to converse with each other. There should be institutional interaction, if not
cooperation, on terrorism. There are grey areas where intelligence agencies of both
countries can work together. In an institutional arrangement, the station chiefs in both Delhi
and Islamabad would be open posts. Intelligence officers in both the embassies should be
known to each other for forging regular communication between them. Further, India and
Pakistan should keep talking no matter what the situation is, good or bad. When we stop
talking, the media find an opportunity to start speaking whatever it likes making a situation
reduced from bad to worse.

Durrani says that the institutional interaction is absolutely necessary at least for not letting
any group derail the peace process. Jadhav should be returned at the right price. Durrani
says that as Masood Azhar is wanted by both India and Pakistan, China should stop vetoing
the action on Azhar at the UN. Moreover, India should not play the big brother role in
bilateral relations. After the Mumbai attack, DG ISI was not sent to India (against the advice
of Zardari) because the mode to send him was objectionable and because a precedent
would be set for any similar incidents in the future.

Chapter 32: Akhand Bharat Confederation Doctrine

Durrani says that the Gujral Doctrine had much sense especially its sub-regionalisation
aspect calling for improving relations with every country. The doctrine also called for
starting with the smaller countries or even regions or sub-regions such as two Punjabs, two
Kashmirs and across the border. The doctrine allowed these sub-regions to open their
space of sports, festivals, etc., for each other. This would initiate people-to-people contact
and would lead to confidence building. However, the dilemma with the establishment is that
it is paranoid and looks at everyone with suspicion.

Dulat says that the idea of Akhand Bharat, a mad obsession with nationalism, was an ultra-
right idea but it was laid to rest when Vajpayee visited Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore in February

Durrani says that it was Indian National Congress which did not accept the Cabinet Mission
Plan. Jinnah had accepted it to preserve united India. Jinnah’s idea of Pakistan was to get
the best deal for Muslims such as maximum autonomy for the regions with a Muslim majority
when the British were leaving. Divisions created conflicts and problems. If not now, in the
future, the new South Asian Union or a Confederation of South Asia can be developed on
the pattern of the European Union having a common currency. This idea can appease the
nostalgia of Akhand Bharat. Similarly, a unified independent Kashmir is also possible.

Chapter 33: Deewangi Khatam

Dulat and Durrani agree on the point that talks should be continued between the two
countries and also between two intelligence organisations, RAW and ISI. There is much to
gain from each other by understanding each other. The madness between India and
Pakistan must end: “Yeh deewangi kab khatam hogi?”

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