Over to you, Foreign Office

Daily: Pakistan Today
Date: 13.09.17

On August 21, the pronouncement of the South Asia policy encompassing Afghanistan by
US President Donald Trump failed to create the kind of panic generated by the declaration
issued from the platform of the 9th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
Summit on September 4. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Xiamen or BRICS
declaration, the celerity showed by the Foreign Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, to visit
China, Russia, Turkey and Iran, apparently to discuss Trump’s policy, is indicative of the
horror that gripped Pakistan.

In response to Trump’s policy, on August 22 China immediately stressed for the need of
recognizing Pakistan’s efforts in stamping out the scourge of terrorism. However, after a few
days, in the BRICS declaration (in the 48th paragraph of the 43-page declaration), China
acknowledged the presence of certain terrorist networks in the region affecting India (e.g.
Jaish-e-Mohammad, Laskar-i-Taiba and Hizb ut-Tahrir) and Afghanistan (e.g. the Haqqani
network, the Taliban, al-Qaida), without naming Pakistan. Somehow, the BRICS declaration
has valued the concerns of both India and Afghanistan.

China offers two justifications for the BRICS declaration. First, the United Nations (UN) had
already banned these militant organizations. Second, the declaration demanded nothing
new from Pakistan. This is a polite face saving for Pakistan despite the fact that the
declaration laid bare three points. First, the declaration stressed on the primary leading
role and responsibility of states to prevent financing of terrorist networks and to counter
terrorist actions from their territories. Second, the declaration laid emphasis on the
necessity for developing international cooperation as per the international law to respect
sovereign equality of states and non-interference in their internal affairs.  Third, the
declaration called for expeditious finalization and adoption of Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism (CCIT) by the General Assembly of the UN. Nevertheless, in the
declaration, the only solace for the Pakistan was that, compared to the 8th BRICS Summit
in October 2016 in Goa (India) where Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi condemned
Pakistan in his plenary speech by calling Pakistan “the mothership” of terrorism and
“terrorism has become its favourite child”, no such speech was allowed to Modi. In short,
China’s reaction to the Trump’s speech and China’s stance expressed in the BRICS
declaration can be summed up in this way: no doubt terrorist organizations are extant (in
Pakistan), yet Pakistan is fighting the war against terrorism. Pakistan has not declared that
the war on terror is over.

Domestically, the declaration has served one main purpose: it has brought the initiative to
run Pakistan’s foreign policy back to the foreign office. On July 28, the judicial ouster of the
former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (who was also the Foreign Minister) opened sufficient
latitude for the repositioning of civil-military relations. The readjustment did take place and
Pakistanis started hearing its thuds and thumps especially since August 14, when the idea-
cum-ambition of the national security started dictating the foreign policy publicly. The public
was to be informed who was in charge. The newfound place of national security braved
August 21, the speech of President Trump, but it could not withstand September 4, the
BRICS declaration. The damage had been done to Pakistan’s standing in the world and, on
September 5, Pakistan stood isolated both regionally and internationally. In his speech in
the GHQ at the occasion of Defence Day on September 6, the COAS General Qamar Javed
Bajwa said that the prerogative and responsibility of launching jihad rested with the state,
thereby meaning that the proxies lost the aim and justification of survival.  This was the call:
“Over to you, the Foreign Office,” that spurred Khawaja Asif into action on September 7
coincided with the conclusion of the ambassadors’ conference at the Foreign Office. The
apparent attempt is to control the damage. It must be a matter of interest to watch what
would have been the reaction of Nawaz Sharif, if he had been in power in the phase of
national security lasted from July 28 to September 6.

This is where the problem lies in Pakistan. The country leaning on national security
overlooks the importance of diplomacy, which predicates on rounds and rounds of
negotiations. Before the BRICS declaration, the “ghairat” (honour) of Pakistanis did not
allow them to host a meeting with Ms Alice Wells (the Acting Assistant Secretary of State in-
charge of South and Central Asia), who was about to visit Pakistan. However, after the
BRICS declaration, the “ghairat” allowed Pakistanis to send the foreign minister immediately
to visit the four-countries for negotiations before he visits the US. The point is simple: if
Pakistan had not closed the door of negotiations with visiting US officials, there would have
been left much with Pakistan to save face and avoid isolation. Moreover, the urgency
showed by Pakistan after the BRICS declaration is of little use. The BRICS is the forum of
economic cooperation amongst member countries for their collective economic growth. This
allows India bracket itself with China and Russia. On the other hand, Pakistan relies on the
economic aid from China and Russia and this point subordinates Pakistan to these

There is another dimension of the issue. The panic overwhelming the foreign office
indicates that Pakistan was not taken into confidence before the BRICS declaration and
one of the reasons for the same may be that China changed its mind during the BRICS
conference. The unconfirmed reports are that, much to the chagrin of China, at least two
member countries of the BRICS conveyed to China of their intent not to issue (or put their
signatures on) a joint declaration of the conference if their concerns were not taken into
account. In this way, China was left with the choice of either signing the declaration in its
present form or issuing no declaration at all. For China, the embarrassing moment stared it
in the face especially when the BRICS conference was taking place on its land (Xiamen).
China failed to afford this mortification and signed the declaration in the present form.
However, one favour China offered to Pakistan was the exclusion of Pakistan’s name from
its direct association with terrorist groups functional in Greater Asia. Nevertheless, for other
countries, the name of Pakistan is present implicitly. On the one hand, China became able
to save the future of the BRICS while on the other hand China saved Pakistan from any
direct allegation.

The post-BRICS scenario has left Pakistan with the choice of brooding and figuring out the
reasons for receiving the regional and global rebuff. Nevertheless, there are three main
conclusions Pakistan can draw. First, the (national) security policy cannot dictate the
(national) foreign policy. That is, the GHQ cannot run the affairs of the foreign office, which
has to be empowered instead of reducing it to respond to panic moments only. Second,
localism (or domestic situations) cannot dictate regionalism or globalism. It is the other way
round. That is, regionalization or globalization is no respecter of a country’s drives and
desires touted locally. Third, Pakistan overestimated its position by assuming that it could
divorce (or even antagonize) the US and take shelter under China and Russia. Pakistan
overlooked the fact that, unlike its own disastrous penchant, China and Russia do not look
for isolation. The Cold War is over and the alliances are now more economic than strategic.
Even in any strategic alliance, the economic factor assumes the central importance.

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