Husain Haqqani on the origin of the Kashmir issue

Daily: Daily Times
Date: 24.08.16

Pakistan’s ex-ambassador to the US Husain Haqqani’s recently launched book, "I
ndia vs
Pakistan: Why Can’t We Just Be Friends?
” has several pieces of disinformation. This
opinion piece will debate his views only on the origin of the Kashmir issue.

Haqqani is of the view that Pakistan (i.e. the state of Pakistan including the then ruling
Muslim League and the Pakistan army) was involved in the uprising in Kashmir — the
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir — leading eventually to Kashmir’s accession to India.
For instance, on page 22 of the book, Haqqani writes: “Pakistan tried to strengthen its hand
in Jammu and Kashmir with the help of armed volunteers, recruited from among Pashtun
tribesmen. This in turn paved the way for India’s direct military involvement.” Similarly, on
page 50, Haqqani writes: “So Muslim League politicians, supported by senior Muslim
officers of the Pakistan army, organised a tribal lashkar (militia) drawn from the areas
bordering Afghanistan. The lashkar’s invasion of Kashmir provided justification for the
Indian army to land in Jammu and Kashmir, ostensibly after a panicked maharaja signed the
Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. Pakistan has contested that accession ever
since.” In fact, this was not the case.

In early September 1947, it was Kashmir’s Poonch district where unrest erupted against
Maharaja Hari Singh, a descendant of the Hindu Dogra Dynasty. This incident was not a
new thing. In Kashmir, there was a history of upheavals, as happened in 1931 and 1934 in
reaction to depriving Muslims from participating in state affairs. However, this time the
immediate cause of turmoil was selectively over-taxing Muslim peasants followed by forced
collection by the Dogra army, as also stated by Alastair Lamb in his 1997
Incomplete
Partition
(pages 121-123). In this way, the unrest was local in both cause and effect. The
point is simple: Pakistan did not ask Hari Singh to undertake such an act at this time of
history.

The Dogra army tried to get hold of Poonch by grueling the peasants overlooking the fact
that the people of Poonch were mostly ex-servicemen who fought in the Second World War
alongside the British. Consequently, an armed-rebellion erupted against Hari Singh, as also
cited in
Official Records of the United Nations Security Council (on March 6, 1951, Meeting
No. 534, pages 3-4). Soon the rebellion spread to adjacent areas, and a wave of communal
riots surged affecting both Muslim and Hindu majority areas in Kashmir. Again, the point is
simple: Pakistan did not ask Hari Singh to persecute the peasants of Poonch.

To fight the Dogra army, the peasants of Poonch — mostly related to the Sudhan tribe —
needed weapons and manpower in search of which, in early-October, they reached
Pakistan’s tribal area, an ancestral home of most of them claiming the Pashtun lineage. The
peasants bought weapons from the tribal black market, and persuaded armed volunteers to
accompany them to Poonch to fight against the Dogra army, as also reported by
Special
Branch daily diary
(15-17 October 1947: bundle no. 50, Serial no. 816, today’s Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa).

On October 21, together they entered Kashmir through Haripur-Muzaffarabad route, as
reported by Christopher Snedden in his 2013
Kashmir: The Unwritten History, page 59. At
that time, Pakistan was immersed in settling refugees and managing the nascent country
whose share of financial assets had been denied by India. Again, the point is simple: if
there had been any connivance between the peasants of Poonch or the Poonch rebels and
Pakistan, the former would not have spent money in buying weapons and persuading
tribesmen for several days to help them out.

By October 24, the tribesmen met their objective of repulsing the Dogra army from Poonch,
as also mentioned in the Indian Official History, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
(1987,
Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48, Thomson Press Limited, New Delhi).
Afterwards, the tribesmen became embroiled in plundering, especially in Baramullah, what
came their way to Srinagar, and spent at least two days dallying in the suburbs of Srinagar.
The point is simple: if there had been regular Pakistan army troops involved in or leading
this incursion, these tribesmen would not have abated their conquest spree just 20
kilometres short of Srinagar and its airport.

Moreover, on October 24, in Pallandri, the Poonch rebels declared an independent (azad)
government of Kashmir. However, Pakistan did not recognise it. The point is simple: if
Pakistan had been in collusion with these rebels, Pakistan would have recognised the azad
government immediately.

On October 26, the Instrument of Accession was reportedly signed, and the next day the
Indian paratroopers landed on Srinagar airport to support Hari Singh and retrieve the
occupied part of Kashmir. The role of Pakistan started afterwards, first at the diplomatic and
later at the physical level. Hence, by October 26, the initiative rested with the peasants of
Poonch or the Poonch rebels, and not with Pakistan or even the Pashtun tribesmen. Nor
did Pakistan foment the rebellion.

If Pakistan had wanted to seize Kashmir by force, there was no reason to sign the Standstill
agreement with Hari Singh on August 15, on his request, to maintain the status quo with
Kashmir. The same is the argument against the alleged violation of the agreement.
Secondly, if the Poonch rebellion had occurred after Kashmir signed the Instrument of
Accession with India, one could have presumed that the Poonch rebellion was the
handiwork of Pakistan, and not otherwise.

On the one hand, if the road access to Kashmir had not been given to India by the Radcliffe
Award of August 17, Hari Singh might not have signed the Instrument of Accession with
India despite all revolts. On the other hand, though the Radcliffe Award had provided India
with a road access to Kashmir, the journey of India towards Kashmir was shortened by the
Poonch insurgence.

Neither is there any evidence nor is there any argument to explicate that the rebellion could
favour Pakistan anyhow or it could throw Kashmir automatically into the lap of Pakistan.
Secondly, there was no cogent need on the part of Pakistan to encourage tribesmen to do
its bidding. In fact, in light of the Indian Independence Act 1947, Pakistan was sure that the
whole of Kashmir would join it owing to Kashmir’s having Muslim majority and physical
contiguity with it. However, the Poonch rebels and their supportive tribesmen unwittingly
ruined the case of Pakistan on Kashmir, and made Pakistan to be content eventually with
only 35 percent of Kashmir.

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